Download Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and Its by Irving John Good PDF

By Irving John Good

This in-depth therapy of chance concept via a recognized British statistician explores Keynesian ideas and surveys such issues as Bayesian rationality, corroboration, speculation trying out, and mathematical instruments for induction and ease. extra matters contain causality and rationalization, causal calculus, and an intensive distinction of likelihood and information. 1983 edition.

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Compromises between subjective probabilities and credibilities are also desirable because standard priors might be more general-purpose than nonstandard ones. In fact it is mentally healthy to think of your subjective probabilities as estimates of credibilities (p. 5). Credibilities are an ideal that we cannot reach. 16. " Ockham (actually his eminent predecessor John Duns Scotus) in effect emphasized simplicity alone, without reference to degrees of explaining the facts. ) 17. The relative probabilities of two hypotheses are more relevant to science than the probabilities of hypotheses tout court (pp.

The conscious recognition or otherwise of quasiutilities constitutes the sixth facet. (vii) Physical Probability Different Bayesians have different attitudes to the question of physical probability, de Finetti regards it as a concept that can be defined in terms of subjective probability, and does not attribute any other "real existence" to it. My view, or that of my alter ego, is that it seems reasonable to suppose that 32 THE BAYESIAN INFLUENCE (#838) physical probabilities do exist, but that they can be measured only be means of a theory of subjective probability.

I do not claim that any of these principles were "discovered last week" (to quote Oscar Kempthorne's off-the-cuff contribution to the spoken discussion), in fact I have developed, acquired or published them over a period of decades, and most of them were used by others before 1940, in one form or another, and with various degrees of bakedness or emphasis. The main merit that I claim for the Doogian THE BAYESIAN INFLUENCE (#838) 25 philosophy is that it codifies and exemplifies an adequately complete and simple theory of rationality, complete in the sense that it is I believe not subject to the criticisms that are usually directed at other forms of Bayesianism, and simple in the sense that it attains realism with the minimum of machinery.

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