By Gilbert Harman
Explaining price is a variety of the simplest of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in ethical philosophy. The 13 essays are divided into 4 sections, which concentration in activate ethical relativism, values and valuing, personality characteristics and advantage ethics, and methods of explaining points of morality. Harman's distinct method of ethical philosophy has provoked a lot curiosity; this quantity bargains a desirable conspectus of his most vital paintings within the zone.
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Extra resources for Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy
5 An Objection to Normative Moral Relativism According to normative moral relativism there can be two people A and B and a moral demand D such that (1) (2) (3) (4) A is subject to D, B is not subject to D, B is subject to some moral demands, there is no moral demand D* to which A and B are both subject and which accounts for (1) and (2) given the difference in situation between A and B. The obvious objection to this is that, if (1), (2), and (3) are true, there must be some reason why A but not B is subject to D, for surely this cannot WHAT IS MORAL RELATIVISM?
Finally, a relativistic ideal observer theorist with the sort of view Brandt (1954) defends can accept moral judgement relativism without accepting meta-ethical relativism, since he can suppose that two really (as opposed to merely apparently) conﬂicting moral judgements cannot both be right. And such a theorist can reject normative moral relativism too, for example, on the grounds that if he were an ideal observer he would apply the same basic principles to everyone. So, it is possible to accept any one of these versions of moral relativism without being committed to the others.
It is possible that most people do not accept the naive view. But many people do accept it, especially teachers of moral philosophy, and people who accept it often take it to be the ordinary view. 4) The naive view has three parts. First, it says that there are certain basic moral demands that everyone accepts or at least has reasons to accept. Let me refer to this as the claim that morality is ‘absolute’. Second, these demands are supposed to be accepted as demands on everyone. They are to have universal application.